Husserl v. Descartes

A lot of what goes into this post is borrowed from the following video of an interview of Barrett, which I would highly suggest myself both because this is pretty much where all of my information on the subject comes from, and also because...I don't know, maybe you'd like to follow along:

I want to bring up phenomenology, in part because of the vague interest in intellectual masturbation over armchair philosophy--with all of the negative connotations of those words brought up on purpose for the purpose of some self-indictment here--but also to get into some self-rumination as to the meaning of 'boredom' and the different takes based on these philosophies that one can come to.

Coming at existentialism via differentiating it from the idea of a Cartesian split I find to be an interesting and fruitful starting point--although, supposedly, it is inherently wrong in some sense (insofar as I gather that Sartre was a Cartesian (as are all good Frenchmen), but, to be honest with you, I'm not an expert in this stuff, I'm a random douchebag on the internet--take what you're reading here with a grain of salt).  In the Cartesian point of view, there is a mind-body problem--the mind and body as separate, with the body symbolizing the external world.  Whereas, I think the key evidence from our own lives that indicates that there is something wrong with this is, for example, the experience of 'spacing out'.  I suppose the Cartesian would explain the lapse in consciousness via some sort of Maxwellian Demon, but we can trace back our having existed in some sense.  The lapse of thought not necessarily being indicting of the lapse of being, and that therefore existence is prior to being as opposed to the alternative.  This is what I think is primary evidence--or at least heuristic justification, for the support of existentialism.

Now, with this idea, I'd like to bring up some ideas regarding Husserl and phenomenology.  Likewise, for those who like to follow along with where most of my thoughts have come from:

I'd like to recall the idea of bracketing, or phenomenological reduction, that instead of asking about whether an object exists or not, we at the very least accept that it is an object of our consciousness, and treat it as such and explain the object as such.

This, is the introduction to which I would like to treat the question of boredom.  As an object of consciousness.  What is boredom insofar as an object of our experience, and how do we _experience_ it?  That would be the phenomological reduction of the problem, I believe.  Whereas, if I were to treat it in a more empirical sense, as I suppose might be further possible in a Cartesian framework (although technically in both), I could ask what are the physiological influences _of_ boredom?

And, with this introduction, this is how I hope to explore boredom in the next two posts:  as an object of consciousness, and as an object of external reality.